Independent Researcher

A Review of the Iran-US-Israel War and Its Impact on Regional Order

Introduction: Four Decades of Tarnished Theocratic Regime.

The violent standoff between the Islamic Republic of Iran and strong, united American and Israeli forces is not just another chapter of the region’s tumultuous history but also reflects the end of a government that has exhausted strategic options. So as we see the coming of the end of what appears to be a long battle, the issue that arises once the missile sites and nuclear facilities have been destroyed does not involve the theocratic system, but rather what its successor will look like. The evidence suggests the Islamic Republic is facing an unprecedented existential crisis from which recovery becomes less probable. This systemic erosion of Iran’s military strength, destruction of its regional proxy network, and the significant loss of legitimacy of the regime among its own people has led to the situation where the potential of any adjustments is clearly called into question.

The Military Side: The IRGC Strategically Useless.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC was viewed as the backbone of the regime’s ability to use force and act as an instrument to project power in the region, as it is supposed to. In the struggle, it has suffered heavy losses. Western military operations have systematically singled out and destroyed most of Iran’s ballistic missiles, leaving the rest of the stockpile open to preemptive destruction. This shifts the balance of power in the region considerably, because the IRGC can no longer pose a threat to its neighbors or Western interests. The targeted killings of high-ranking IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists have also played a very important role. This method of decapitation has not only stolen critical operational know-how but also inflicted deep hurt on the organisation. The IRGC’s operational readiness is now in grave jeopardy because it has lost decades of institutional knowledge of its institutions that aren’t easily reconstituted. That’s when the regime needs the most defensive capabilities. For years, Tehran had considered its nuclear programme the highest defensive mechanism of its kind, the means to guard against regime change, and now it is in ruins. International assessments say that Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons or even utilise nuclear energy to power civilian uses has been drastically constrained. Centrifuge facilities, research labs and the loss of key scientists have brought Iran’s nuclear aspirations back decades, if not forever.

The Proxy Network: The End of the World.

Iran’s network of regional proxies might have declined more than any other component of its strategic position. The Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi movement, and a number of Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria—carefully assembled over decades, all of them worth billions of dollars— many of them are now thoroughly destroyed. All methods the regime has used to project power asymmetrically through non-state actors while retaining plausible deniability have been obliterated. This breakdown of proxy has far-reaching repercussions that extend well beyond military ones. They were fighting not just for ideological ends but also for spreading concepts, constructing economies, and consolidating political power across the Muslim world. Their eradication indicates the crumbling of the regime’s multifaceted regional approach, and it removes any hope of Iran renewing its “Axis of Resistance” anytime soon.

The Succession Problem: Mojtaba Khamenei and the Boundaries of A Dynastic Transition.

The terrible killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in US military attacks has produced the succession issue that many long expected. The arrival of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the Supreme Leader, calling himself the “Third Supreme Leader,” is a striking 180 from the Islamic Republic’s purported commitment to clerical meritocracy. It also highlights how dynastic the system has been throughout the years, though cloaked in religious rhetoric, as the transition of power to Mojtaba Khamenei signifies a departure from the principles of meritocracy that were once emphasised by the Islamic Republic. Mojtaba’s meteoric ascendance to absolute power, though arguably inevitable since the circumstances have already begun to unravel, has grievous consequences for the regime’s already fragile legitimacy. No, his power did not come from constitutional mechanisms established to facilitate change; rather, he rose in power through brute force and faction during a time of national crisis by the IRGC. This egregious power grab has driven away any remaining support for the system from existing factions. On another issue, Mojtaba’s personal situation makes it impossible for him to arrive at a long-term agreement with the Western powers—the Supreme Leader has lost his father in wartime to American forces and has psychological baggage that will affect his strategic thinking. The regime has remained united internally by maintaining external antagonists, principally the United States and Israel. Mojtaba can’t just drop that basic story without undermining the very foundation of his strength.

Local delegitimisation: The regime’s shattered social contract.

At home, the Islamic Republic’s situation has deteriorated in the past years, and the current crisis has exacerbated it further. The murderous repression of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the systemic murder of peaceful protesters, and the growing number of corruption scandals involving senior government officials have destroyed the last piece of the social contract between the state and its people. Even traditional regime supporters, such as orthodox religious groups, the rural poor, or those with strong ideological commitments, have expressed disillusionment. Because the government has been unable to achieve economic growth, has been hypocritical regarding religious ideals, and is willing to put Iranian lives on the line, support for the government is at a record low. The IRGC used to have the ability to mobilise around stuff, but nowadays, it has just established a rule of fear and force. This loss of legitimacy in the domestic context has important strategic impacts. A government that relies not only on what the people want but also on its security forces must depend on what it can use to keep the people in line, creating a feedback loop of repression that makes people angrier at it on one hand and fosters hate and violence on the other. These current conditions epitomise this complexity, as the government ultimately controls life based on the IRGC’s willingness to use violence against its own people.

The Gulf Dimension: A Disaster in Diplomacy

The regime has harassed its Arab partners in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman). And this may be one of the worst geopolitical choices it has made. These countries had specifically made it clear that they wouldn’t participate in American military operations against Iran, with Washington putting inordinate pressure on them to do so, making this attack all the more significant. There can be no reasonable strategic calculus for the regime to strike these neutral groups. The only way to understand it is as a desperate effort by a system that has lost all capacity for coherent policymaking, reflecting its isolation and the failure of its alliances with Russia and China, which have not provided any meaningful support in this context. The Tehran regime has turned any hope of diplomatic off-ramps from being at all possible into foes and deepened regional resistance to its continued existence. The Gulf governments have been willing (and justified) to stay out of the way of Western military action, but now they must choose whether to remain neutral in the face of unnecessary aggression. The regime’s actions have confirmed the most aggressive views of Iranian aims and eliminated the political problems at home which might have stopped Gulf countries’ participation in future military operations, thereby increasing the likelihood of a united front against perceived threats from Iran. It’s this type of strategic error, a huge mistake that indicates how much logical decision-making has collapsed under the Iranian leadership.

Russia and China: Unsupported by Great Powers. Iran’s so-called great power friends have done nothing useful to relieve the current condition. Even after decades of strategic engagement and arms sales, neither Russia nor China has done anything meaningful in supporting the Islamic Republic. This abandonment, by its very nature, demonstrates the fact that Moscow and Beijing are considering the real costs and benefits of a war and the advantages and costs of fighting with the United States if a government is disintegrating into bits to maintain balance of power. Russia has also been busy with its own geopolitical challenges and is too reliant on Western technology and financial institutions to risk taking a hard line on Washington, with that country’s economic interest in Tehran. China has also taken no actions that could sour its trade relationships with the West, despite formally supporting Iran’s independence. The regime is all alone again, with no regional allies or great powers willing to help in any meaningful way.

The Path Forward: Join up with the IRGC or make a democracy, now the dictatorship faces two choices, both types of capitulation. Option one is to have the IRGC command all government functions and directly try to engage with Western nations. This sort of deal might last for a time, but it is not going to last long because there simply are too many problems to maintain it. The way that the IRGC operates in all of its various ways and in its financial incentives to avoid sanctions as a strategy to evade it and its ideological commitment and dedication to its fights against Western-influenced ideological influence mean we cannot go back to normal again. Any compromise negotiated under these conditions would only create a temporary respite, but the organization would continue rebuilding its authority to be strong. For decades, Western leaders’ experience with Iran’s dishonesty makes it unlikely they would offer an IRGC-led government any meaningful relief from sanctions or security assurances. That is exactly why it is more sustainable for the West to work with the Iranian democratic opposition, embodied in Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. Pahlavi is also more than a relic; he is a symbol of a possible democratic shift. The situation contrasts with the numerous international exile groups that arose in the decades since. People both at home and abroad revere him for his commitment to secular democracy, human rights, and a peaceful transition. As a political entity, the Islamic Republic of Iran has nearly ceased to exist. What is left is a force that no longer has its legitimacy, its military strength, its regional power, or its popular support. The IRGC is not immune, however, and it can prolong this concluding phase by further repression, but the critical course of action remains apparent and unchanging. Western leaders need to closely engage with democratic elements of the opposition, such as Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, while maintaining pressure on any remaining power in Tehran. No less important, however, is the goal of setting the stage not simply to oust the government but to usher in a truly democratic transition. This will require continued aid from other countries and cooperation with domestic opposition efforts, such as providing resources for grassroots movements and facilitating dialogue among various opposition groups.

The Iranian people have lived under theocratic government for 47 years; thus, they should be able to choose their own political future through free and fair elections. It seems like that future is closer now than it has been since the 1979 revolution, and the world community is responsible for making sure that this chance is not missed.

References:

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The End of the Islamic Republic: A Strategic Failure and a New Route for Democracy in Iran. © 2025 by Monarchguard.uk is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0